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Abstract
We consider the blackbox transfer-based targeted adversarial attack threat model in
the realm of deep neural network (DNN) image classifiers. Rather than focusing
on crossing decision boundaries at the output layer of the source model, our
method perturbs representations throughout the extracted feature hierarchy to
resemble other classes. We design a flexible attack framework that allows for multi-
layer perturbations and demonstrates state-of-the-art targeted transfer performance
between ImageNet DNNs. We also show the superiority of our feature space
methods under a relaxation of the common assumption that the source and target
models are trained on the same dataset and label space, in some instances achieving
a 10× increase in targeted success rate relative to other blackbox transfer methods.
Finally, we analyze why the proposed methods outperform existing attack strategies
and show an extension of the method in the case when limited queries to the
blackbox model are allowed.
1 Introduction
The adversarial machine learning community has devised many ways to cause Deep Neural Networks
(DNNs) to behave unexpectedly [32, 7, 2, 21, 19]. However, the knowledge assumptions and threat
models considered by an adversary are critical to attack success. In settings where access to and
familiarity with the the target model is restricted, there is significant room for improving adversarial
methods in terms of potency and efficiency, which is the central motivation for this work.
We focus on the blackbox transfer-based adversarial threat model for DNN image classifiers. In
the standard case, blackbox means the attacker does not have access to the gradients of the tar-
get model and makes no assumptions about its architecture. Transfer-based indicates that adver-
sarial examples are created by computing adversarial perturbations using a substitute whitebox
model and then attacking the target blackbox model with the resulting examples, leveraging the
notion of transferability [23, 24, 33]. Within this threat model, our specific goal is targeted ad-
versarial attacks, meaning the objective is to induce the target model to output a specific class.
Figure 1: Visualization of forward pass construction to
optimize our feature space attack objective.
These are significantly more challenging
than un-targeted attacks, which seek to
simply cause an incorrect prediction. In
addition, we consider a set of more “strict”
blackbox threat models in which we make
varying degrees of assumptions about ac-
cess to the blackbox model’s training data
distribution. This includes cases when the
label spaces of the whitebox and black-
box models differ, and when there is zero
training data overlap.
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A recent innovation in transfer attacks within the standard blackbox threat model is to craft perturba-
tions based on intermediate layer representations, rather than simply optimizing the classification loss
at the output layer [26, 13, 14, 18]. An example of such a method is the Feature Distribution Attack
(FDA) [14], which computes adversarial examples using intermediate feature distributions at a single
layer of the whitebox model. In this work, we propose to significantly improve the FDA method by
extending it into a more flexible framework to allow for perturbations across the intermediate feature
space, including the output layer. Our method relies on modeling the layer-wise and class-wise
feature distributions of the whitebox model via auxiliary networks. We then optimize adversarial
noise using the auxiliary models from across the deep feature space. The critical observation in this
work is that by enforcing that a perturbed sample “looks-like” a target class sample in multiple layers
across the depth of the whitebox model, the resulting sample is likely to have a much higher transfer
rate than if we only considered a single intermediate layer or the output layer in isolation. For an
intuition for how the attack works, consider Figure 1, which shows the forward pass required to
generate adversarial noise given a pre-trained DNN f . Each g`,ytgt is a feature distribution model
that estimates the probability that the layer ` feature map f`(x) is from a sample of class ytgt, i.e.
p(ytgt|f`(x)). For a chosen ytgt and set of layers, we accumulate the losses w.r.t. ytgt at each
intermediate layer and the output layer. By optimizing the sum, we are noising x with δ such that
x+ δ lies in high probability regions of the target class at several layers across feature space. We find
that this method significantly improves transferability of the generated adversarial samples.
To evaluate our methods, we consider both standard and strict blackbox transfer cases. In the standard
case, our attacks show state-of-the-art targeted transfer performance between popular ImageNet-
1K [4] DNN models. In some cases, we improve the targeted success rate to over 55%, an absolute
increase of about 50% over traditional output-layer-based methods. In the strict blackbox scenario,
we evaluate our method under three separate relaxations of the common transfer assumption that
the source and target models are trained on the same data distribution and share a label space. The
results show that our feature-based attacks are significantly more potent than attacks generated at the
output layer in all three situations. In an effort to explain why our methods yield high transferability,
we also analyze the effects of our attacks and show that they cause significantly more disruption in
the intermediate space than competing methods. Finally, we show that the noise generated with our
methods provides a more useful prior direction for query-based attacking methods that incorporate
prior information. With relatively few queries to the blackbox model, our method can be enhanced to
yield over 90% targeted success rates.
2 Related work
In transfer-based blackbox adversarial attack research, many of the most popular methods build
directly upon whitebox attacks [7, 15, 19], adding optimization tricks, regularization, and ensembling
of whitebox models to boost transferability [15, 23, 5, 38, 17, 37]. The primary optimization goal of
such methods is to cause the adversarial sample to cross the whitebox model’s decision boundary
through consideration of the classification loss. For example, Dong et al. [5] includes a momentum
term in the optimization step of [15]; Wu et al. [36] weights the gradients through the residual
connections and blocks differently; Liu et al. [17] and Tramèr et al. [34] use an ensemble of whitebox
models; Xie et al. [37] use diverse inputs for more robust noise; and Sharma et al. [28] and Dong
et al. [6] use low frequency constraints and translation-invariance respectively to generate un-targeted
attacks for defended DNNs. These methods show reasonable un-targeted performance, but very
limited targeted performance at scale, if any ([6, 34, 36, 37] only consider un-targeted attacks).
There are also some recent methods that focus on improving transfer attacks by considering the
feature space of the source model, to develop noise that is less overfit to the generating architecture.
Zhou et al. [38] develop a regularizer for a traditional un-targeted attack that encourages adversarial
examples to have significantly different intermediate feature representations. Huang et al. [11] adjusts
an existing un-targeted adversarial example to have a larger effect in a pre-specified layer of feature
space. Rozsa et al. [26] and Inkawhich et al. [13] develop targeted transfer attacks in feature space,
representing the “target” as a single point in a single layer of the feature space. The objective
functions then minimize the L2 distance between a source and target point in the feature space. With
this limited modeling of the target class, scalability to larger models and datasets proves difficult, and
success is sensitive to the choice of the target sample. To improve targeted transfer performance at
scale, Inkawhich et al. [14] explicitly model the class-wise feature distributions at multiple layers of
the whitebox model, so as to have a more descriptive representation of the target class when attacking.
However, the method only considers attacking from a single layer (with no options for extensions),
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and the primary result is that some individual layers are better than others to transfer from. As is
common in all of the aforementioned methods, results are only shown for transfer scenarios where
the whitebox and blackbox models are trained on the same dataset. For comparison, we develop a
flexible framework that allows for perturbations of multiple layers simultaneously, evaluate in novel
cross-distribution settings, and show an integration of the method with a query-based attack.
3 Methodology
Notation. We follow the notation conventions of Inkawhich et al. [14] for feature distribution
modeling. To capture the layer-wise and class-wise feature distributions of a given pre-trained DNN
f , we first specify a set of layers L = {`1, ..., `J} and classes C = {c1, ..., cK} of interest. Using
the training dataset of f , we train binary classification auxiliary models on the feature maps at the
layers in L for the classes in C. Importantly, all weights of f stay fixed throughout this process.
Let f`(x) be the layer ` feature map of f for input image x. Then, g`,y is a binary auxiliary model
that inputs f`(x), and outputs the probability that the feature map is from an input of class y (i.e.,
g`,y(f`(x)) = p(y|f`(x))). Note, the training of the necessary auxiliary models is done prior to the
attacking process, and requires only a pre-trained model f and its corresponding training dataset.
It is also worth noting that each auxiliary model is small and individually very inexpensive to train
(see Appendix B). Finally, let f(x) be the predicted probability distribution over the set of classes on
which f was trained, and F (x) = argmax f(x) be the classification prediction.
Preliminaries.Once trained, we can use the modeled feature distributions to attack. Given our interest
in targeted attacks, we start from a source image x initially classified as ysrc (i.e. F (x) = ysrc)
and generate a perturbation δ such that F (x + δ) = ytgt for a pre-specified target class ytgt, with
ysrc 6= ytgt. To keep the noise approximately imperceptible and thus adversarial, for the following
objectives we constrain the Lp norm of δ, such that ||δ||p ≤ , and enforce that the perturbed input’s
pixel values exist in [0, 1].
FDA. Our proposed attack framework builds on FDA+fd, the top performing variant of [14], which
is noted here as FDA and described as
max
δ
p(y = ytgt|f`(x+ δ)) + η ‖f`(x+ δ)− f`(x)‖2‖f`(x)‖2
. (1)
This method has two main components, both of which are optimized at a single pre-specified layer `.
The first component is the feature distribution piece, which takes the form of p(y = ytgt|f`(x+ δ)).
By maximizing this probability through optimizing δ, we are perturbing the input image such that the
layer ` feature map f`(x+ δ) lies in a high probability region of the target class in feature space. In
other words, the perturbed feature map resembles a feature map that will be classified as the target
class. The second component is the feature disruption term, which enforces that the feature map of
the perturbed input is significantly different than the feature map of the original input.
FDA+xent. A key contribution in this work is the extension of (1) to include multi-layer information.
One way to do so is to incorporate the whitebox model’s output prediction as part of the attack
objective. Let H(f(x), y) be the standard cross-entropy loss between the predicted probability
distribution f(x) and the target distribution y (commonly a one-hot distribution). We include this
term in the FDA objective to create FDA+xent, as described by
max
δ
p(y = ytgt|f`(x+ δ)) + η ‖f`(x+ δ)− f`(x)‖2‖f`(x)‖2
− γH(f(x+ δ), ytgt), (2)
where γ > 0, weighting the contribution of cross-entropy term. This attack objective optimizes the
noise such that the layer ` feature map is in a high-probability region of the target class, and that the
output prediction of the whitebox model is of the target class. Addition of the cross-entropy term
is motivated by the correlation results from Inkawhich et al. [14], which show that the probability
distribution over the classes, as measured in the “optimal transfer layer,” has low correlation with the
probability distribution over the classes at the output layer. This indicates that the vanilla FDA in (1)
does not reliably create targeted examples for the whitebox model, which may limit the effectiveness
of the attack; we explore this further in Section 4.1.4.
FDA(N). To further generalize the multi-layer framework, we extend the objective function to allow
for optimization in multiple intermediate layers. We call this new attack FDA(N), with objective:
max
δ
∑
`∈L
λ`
[
p(y = ytgt|f`(x+ δ)) + η ‖f`(x+ δ)− f`(x)‖2‖f`(x)‖2
]
, (3)
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where
∑
`∈L λ` = 1, λ` > 0, and the N in the name refers to the number of layers in L. Note that
for N = 1, the attack objective is the same as (1). Both the +xent and multi-intermediate-layer
extensions significantly increase the capability and flexibility of the method, while maintaining the
intuition of attacking primarily based on feature space information. These two extensions can also be
straightforwardly composed to form a FDA(N)+xent attack.
Optimization. The final step in the methodology is the optimization of the above objective functions.
Practically, we leverage the autograd feature of PyTorch by assembling the forward pass of the
attack as shown in Figure 1. This step involves connecting the required auxiliary models to the
corresponding layers of f and computing the final loss with proper weighting. We then use an
iterative projected gradient descent with momentum procedure [5] to apply the adversarial noise to
the input while maintaining the norm and natural image constraints.
4 Experiments
We evaluate the multi-layer FDA framework in a variety of settings. In Section 4.1, we consider the
standard blackbox transfer case, where knowledge of the target model’s training dataset is assumed,
and test transferability between ImageNet-1K models. We examine single-source single-target model
transfers, ensemble transfers, distal adversaries, and analyze why and how the attacks work through
the lens of feature disruption. In Section 4.2 we evaluate transferability in cross-distributional settings,
where the source and target model are trained on different data distributions and label spaces. Finally,
in Section 4.3 we show an extension of the method when limited queries to the target model are
allowed during attack generation.
4.1 ImageNet transfer experiments
Experimental Setup. In our analysis, we use the following ImageNet-1K models from the PyTorch
Model Zoo: ResNet-34/50/101/152 (RN34, RN50, RN101, RN152) [9]; VGG16bn and VGG19bn
[30]; MobileNetv2 (MNv2) [27]; and DenseNet-121/161/201 (DN121, DN161, DN201) [10]. The
notation RN50→DN121 means attacks are generated on a RN50 whitebox (source) model and
transferred to a DN121 blackbox (target) model. The primary metrics of attack success are the
error rate and targeted success rate (tSuc) in the blackbox model, where all clean samples are
correctly classified by both the source and target models. For the attack settings, we use the common
L∞  = 16/255 and perturb_iters = 10. The architecture of each auxiliary model g`,y is a simple
Conv-Conv-FC scheme, which is significantly more parameter efficient than the FC-FC in [14].
To find the best combinations of layers for FDA(N) attacks, we use an iterative greedy search on a
held out part of the ImageNet validation set and find value in including up to 5 layers. Crucially,
feature space attacks have been shown to be blackbox model agnostic: the optimal transfer layer for a
whitebox model does not change for different target blackbox models [13, 14]. For this reason, we find
the optimal layer sets for the RN50 and DN121 whitebox models only once, in the RN50→DN121
and DN121→RN50 transfer scenarios, respectively. When attacking any other blackbox model, we
use the previously found layer combinations. Practically, an attacker may have two models in a
sandbox environment, where one is treated as a whitebox and the other a blackbox. They may then
find the optimal layer settings in this sandbox environment, which can be used to attack any other
blackbox of interest. The layer decoding scheme and the sequence in which the layers are added to
the attack is shown in Appendix A. Finally, we weight all intermediate layers equally, i.e. λ` = 1/N .
Additional details regarding experimental setup are in Appendix B.
4.1.1 Transfer results in standard blackbox settings
We perform single-source single-target model transfers for RN50→{DN121, VGG16bn, RN152,
MNv2} and DN121→{RN50, VGG16bn, DN201, MNv2}. For baselines, we compare against the
popular TMIM [5] and TMIM+SGM [36], both of which search for adversarial directions using only
output layer information of the whitebox model. FDA(1) [14] is also considered a baseline. In an
effort to emphasize the transferability of the noise generation technique when the blackbox model
architecture may be unknown, we favor settings where the source and target model are from different
architectural families to avoid potential biases.
The procedure for measuring the transfer results in Table 1 is as follows. For each source-target
model pair, we randomly select 15,000 source images from the ImageNet validation set for which
both models initially predict the correct source label. For each source sample, we then randomly
select 5 target labels from the ImageNet label set, and execute a targeted attack towards each. Thus,
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Table 1: Full-ImageNet Transfer Results (notation = error / tSuc,  = 16/255)
Whitebox Model = RN50 Whitebox Model = DN121
Attack \\ Target DN121 VGG16bn RN152 MNv2 RN50 VGG16bn DN201 MNv2
TMIM 44.7 / 3.0 48.7 / 1.5 41.4 / 3.2 54.9 / 0.1 46.2 / 2.3 49.6 / 1.3 44.6 / 5.5 58.5 / 1.0
TMIM+SGM 47.4 / 4.5 51.9 / 2.4 43.1 / 4.2 61.1 / 2.2 54.8 / 4.7 53.8 / 2.8 51.4 / 10.0 66.1 / 3.2
FDA(1) 90.3 / 19.4 86.6 / 13.6 90.8 / 17.1 84.7 / 7.1 91.8 / 20.4 90.6 / 20.6 94.8 / 35.3 88.4 / 10.7
FDA(2) 93.1 / 28.4 91.5 / 22.9 92.7 / 22.0 89.8 / 10.7 95.1 / 22.3 94.7 / 26.3 96.6 / 38.9 93.0 / 12.4
FDA(3) 94.1 / 31.0 93.0 / 26.1 93.2 / 22.9 91.0 / 11.8 95.1 / 22.2 94.7 / 26.0 96.7 / 37.1 92.8 / 12.6
FDA(4) 94.2 / 38.1 92.4 / 30.7 93.6 / 30.6 90.2 / 14.9 92.9 / 43.7 92.4 / 42.6 96.3 / 67.5 88.9 / 20.9
FDA(5) 94.2 / 38.6 92.7 / 31.0 93.5 / 29.7 90.9 / 15.1 93.8 / 44.4 93.4 / 44.4 96.6 / 68.2 90.6 / 22.4
FDA(1)+xent 84.4 / 40.3 80.9 / 24.9 85.0 / 42.3 78.6 / 13.2 88.8 / 37.4 87.8 / 32.7 93.3 / 65.3 85.1 / 16.9
FDA(2)+xent 89.0 / 51.7 86.8 / 37.2 88.2 / 48.1 84.3 / 18.7 92.7 / 40.5 92.5 / 40.5 95.5 / 70.3 90.1 / 19.4
FDA(3)+xent 90.2 / 55.2 88.3 / 41.6 89.2 / 49.2 85.6 / 21.1 92.9 / 41.7 92.5 / 41.8 95.7 / 70.6 90.0 / 20.4
FDA(4)+xent 90.5 / 57.3 88.2 / 42.8 89.7 / 53.2 85.4 / 22.4 91.3 / 49.4 90.9 / 46.2 95.3 / 76.5 87.1 / 22.6
FDA(5)+xent 90.9 / 57.9 88.8 / 43.5 89.7 / 51.6 86.4 / 22.9 92.2 / 50.1 92.1 / 48.0 95.6 / 77.1 88.8 / 24.4
every table entry is an average computed over 75,000 targeted attacks. Both error rate and targeted
success rate, as measured in the blackbox model, are reported as "error / tSuc".
Our first major observation is that the +xent component alone gives large gains in tSuc. If we compare
FDA(1) to FDA(1)+xent, in several cases it leads to a tSuc increase of over 20%; for example, in
RN50→DN121 tSuc increases from 19.4% to 40.3%. Further, we observe +xent consistently helps,
regardless of how many layers are used. The largest performance gain observed by +xent is in the
DN121→DN201 case, where in the 1 attack layer case, tSuc increases by 30%. The next result of
interest is the performance gain by adding multiple intermediate layers (FDA(N), N > 1). As N is
increased, tSuc nearly doubles in all cases. For perspective, when we compare these results to the
baseline TMIM-based methods, the targeted success rate in many cases improves by more than 10×.
We also observe that +xent and multi-intermediate-layer are complementary components: in all
transfer scenarios the most powerful targeted attacks arise from using both. Specifically, consider the
FDA(5)+xent attack, which is the most effective in all but one case. When VGG16bn is the target
model, on average this attack outperforms TMIM+SGM by 37% error / 43% tSuc and FDA(1) by
about 2% error / 29% tSuc. An interesting observation is that the +xent term harms error performance,
albeit less relevant because our focus is targeted attacks, and the methods have been optimized for
tSuc. However, in all cases the best FDA(N) method nearly doubles the error induced by TMIM+SGM.
4.1.2 Comparison to ensemble methods
Figure 2: FDA versus ensemble attacks.
Ensemble-based approaches [17] form a separate fam-
ily of methods to generate transferable adversarial
examples, deviating from our previous single-source
model assumption. In this setting, the attacker trains
an ensemble of models (with whitebox access to each)
and generates noise based on the output of the ensem-
ble with traditional attacking techniques, e.g., TMIM.
A natural iterate in ensemble methods is growing the
numbers of models. We compare the effect of adding
a layer within the FDA(N)+xent framework versus
adding a model to the generating ensemble using the
same attack settings as in the previous experiment. To avoid conflicts with models already in use, in
every transfer case we use the following sequence for adding models to the ensemble: [whitebox,
DN161, RN101, VGG19bn, RN34]. For example, in the RN50→DN121 transfer case, using a
3-model ensemble means generating noise from RN50, DN161, and RN101.
The results of these experiments are shown in Figure 2, with extensions in Appendix C. The FDA
methods hold a wide margin over ensemble methods in almost all cases for both error and tSuc,
especially FDA(N)+xent. Also, although adding models to the whitebox ensemble tends to increase
attack performance (as expected), large jumps in the ensemble’s performance usually occur when a
model from the same family as the blackbox model is added. For example, in the DN121→VGG16bn
case, a performance spike happens when the fourth model gets added, which is the VGG19bn model.
Similarly, in the DN121→RN50 case, the ensemble method has the greatest increases when the third
and fifth models are included, which are the RN101 and RN34 models, respectively.
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4.1.3 Distal transfers
Figure 3: Samples of distals.
Distal adversarial examples are generated by starting from random
noise and optimizing for high prediction probability for some target
class [22]. Transferring distals between ImageNet models in the
standard blackbox setting can make for an interesting test of trans-
ferability. Although distals are not our main focus, they provide
a compelling future direction to study, as they depend less on the
source image/class than standard transfers. This eliminates one axis
of variability that may better isolate the quality of the attacking algorithm. For these tests, we do not
constrain  and increase the perturbation budget to allow each attack to perturb for 200 iterations.
Table 2: Distal transfer tSuc rates (top1 / top5)
attack RN50→DN121 RN50→VGG16bn
TPGD 10.1 / 21.0 6.1 / 13.4
FDA(1)+xent 46.9 / 68.1 30.6 / 50.6
FDA(2)+xent 58.6 / 78.8 38.0 / 62.5
FDA(3)+xent 64.0 / 83.6 44.6 / 69.9
FDA(4)+xent 65.8 / 85.3 48.1 / 73.0
The results are shown as top-1 / top-5 tSuc rates,
as averaged over 4,000 distals, each optimized to-
wards a random target class. We use TPGD [19] as
our baseline instead of TMIM, as momentum in the
optimizer empirically harms performance in distal
generation. Table 2 shows that results of the distal
transfers align with the previous trends, and sample
distals are shown in Figure 3. Distals generated with the FDA(N)+xent method are significantly more
transferable. On average, the FDA(4)+xent causes increases of 48% top-1 / 62% top-5 tSuc over the
baseline method.
4.1.4 Analysis of multi-intermediate-layer and +xent
To analyze the effects of the multi-intermediate-layer and +xent components, we perform a feature
disruption analysis [14]. Disruption measures the effect of an adversarial perturbation on the feature
space of a model, w.r.t. the target class. In this setting, we measure the disruption caused by a targeted
attack, at layer ` of model f as: disruption` = p(y = ytgt|f`(x+ δ))− p(y = ytgt|f`(x)). f can
be either a whitebox or blackbox model and the attack that generates δ may be any method. Figure 4
shows the disruption caused by several attacks for RN50→DN121 (see Appendix D for more).
Figure 4: Disruption of features caused by
transfer attacks.
Firstly, the TMIM attack is shown to have drastically
different effects in the whitebox and blackbox mod-
els. Since the noise is generated specifically for the
output layer of the whitebox, it only causes high dis-
ruption in the last few layers of the whitebox, and
very little disruption in the blackbox. For the FDA(1)
method, we already see a significantly different pat-
tern, namely a much higher disruption in the inter-
mediate layers of both models. Now, consider the
effects of adding multiple intermediate layers. As we
look from FDA(1) to FDA(2) to FDA(4), the disrup-
tion is noticeably increased in the earlier and later
layers, which is expected as the added intermediate
layers are both earlier and later than the first layer.
Finally, consider the +xent component. Without it,
the FDA(N) methods have sharp decreases in the last
few layers, despite high intermediate disruption. The inclusion of this term significantly boosts
disruption in the final layers of both the whitebox and blackbox. Given the large effects of our feature
space methods throughout the models, we say that the methods attack along the feature hierarchy.
4.2 Cross-distribution experiments
An often overlooked (but critical) detail in standard blackbox transfer attacks is the underlying
assumption that the whitebox and blackbox models are trained on the exact same dataset [5, 17,
36, 13, 14, 19, 33]. This implies that the adversary can find such a pre-trained model in the open-
source domain or actually has the blackbox model’s dataset and can train their own whitebox model.
In many cases, the dataset used to train the targeted model may not be publicly available due to
proprietary [8, 31], security [16, 29], or privacy [1, 25] issues. Making too strong of an assumption
about the availability of the target model’s data may lead to overly optimistic transfer results. Here, we
evaluate the performance of transfer attacks under several more “strict” blackbox threat models, where
the whitebox model is not trained on the exact same data distribution or label space as the blackbox
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model. We hypothesize that it is more challenging to create transferable adversarial examples if the
source and target models are not trained on identical data.
We are primarily concerned with three “cross-distribution” transfer scenarios:
1. No training data overlap between the whitebox and blackbox, but significant label space overlap.
2. The blackbox is trained on a subset of the whitebox’s training dataset and label space.
3. The whitebox is trained on a subset of the blackbox’s training dataset and label space.
These three cases represent several common situations that may be encountered in reality. For
example, scenarios 1 and 3 may arise when the attacker is generally aware of the types of classes
that the target model is trained on, but has to go out and collect their own data for training the source
model. Scenario 2 may arise when the attacker has access to a large model with a high variety of
classes, and wishes to attack a smaller target model designed for a subset of the classes.
Experimental setup. To accommodate these scenarios, we create three new “Restricted-ImageNet”
datasets (RINet), which are subsets of ImageNet-1k (Full-INet). We design RINet-A and RINet-
B to each be 15-class datasets, sharing 10 label classes while each having 5 unique label
classes. Each of the classes in RINet-A and RINet-B consist of WordNet [20] super-classes
aggregating a related subset of ImageNet-1K classes. Critically, the classes chosen to com-
prise each of the shared classes of RINet-A and RINet-B are disjoint. For example, the “bird”
class of RINet-A is composed of the ImageNet-1k classes: [10:‘brambling’, 13:‘junco’,
16:‘bulbul’, 17:‘jay’, 18:‘magpie’], while RINet-B contains [12:‘housefinch’,
14:‘indigobunting’, 15:‘robin’, 19:‘chickadee’, 20:‘waterouzel’]. As a result,
RINet-A and RINet-B have zero training data overlap. The RINet-C dataset is comprised of 20
classes and is meant to be a bigger subset of Full-INet than RINet-A and RINet-B. We train RN50 and
DN121 models on each of the RINet datasets, then train the auxiliary models necessary to attack with
the FDA(N)+xent framework. For more details regarding setup and the dataset splits, see Appendix
E. Hereafter, the notation RN50-A indicates the RN50 model trained on RINet-A.
Scenario 1. Table 3 shows the error / tSuc results for all three cross-distribution scenarios. First, con-
sider the no training data overlap case as represented by RN50-A→DN121-B and RN50-B→DN121-
A. For baselines, we include the RN50-A→DN121-A and RN50-B→DN121-B. As hypothesized, the
cross-distribution transfer performance is worse than the within-distribution performance. However,
the FDA-based methods still perform well, and significantly better than TMIM. For the DN121-B
target model case, FDA(5)+xent induces 77% error / 63% tSuc when transferred from the RN50-A
whitebox, which is an improvement over TMIM of about 40% error / 51% tSuc. When compared to
the FDA(1) method, our multi-layer extensions lead to improvements of over 9% error / 17% tSuc.
Similar results are shown in RN50-B→DN121-A.
Scenario 2. Next, we analyze the case in which the blackbox model is trained on a subset of
the whitebox model’s training dataset, i.e., RN50-Full→DN121-A/B. Different from the previous
experiment, the complexity of the whitebox and blackbox tasks is significantly different (1,000 class
versus 15 class classification), where the whitebox model’s task is more challenging. Remarkably,
despite such a gap in the task and dataset complexity, the transfer results from the feature distribution
attacks are quite high. In both cases, the error is near 60% and tSuc is over 45%. This is as compared
to the near 16% error / 5% tSuc from the TMIM+SGM attack. Again, we also see large improvements
using multi-intermediate-layer attacks. Interestingly, the +xent component is not helpful in this
Table 3: Transfer results for cross-distribution tests (notation = error / tSuc)
Target Model = DN121-B Target Model = DN121-A Target Model = DN121-Full
Attack \\ Source RN50-A RN50-B RN50-Full RN50-A RN50-B RN50-Full RN50-A RN50-B RN50-C
TMIM 37.8 / 11.7 33.5 / 21.4 16.4 / 3.3 29.9 / 19.2 34.8 / 11.4 12.6 / 2.7 29.2 / 0.9 32.0 / 1.0 35.3 / 2.7
TMIM+SGM 43.0 / 16.6 38.6 / 27.8 19.2 / 5.2 36.6 / 27.0 38.3 / 14.6 16.2 / 4.6 30.4 / 1.2 32.9 / 1.4 37.8 / 3.3
FDA(1) 67.7 / 45.8 70.9 / 60.8 38.6 / 21.0 66.0 / 57.3 67.0 / 40.8 34.8 / 18.9 53.8 / 6.9 58.1 / 8.1 75.8 / 14.1
FDA(2) 72.3 / 54.1 75.5 / 68.0 53.9 / 37.1 72.5 / 65.9 71.3 / 48.4 52.4 / 36.9 59.3 / 9.4 61.5 / 9.2 80.6 / 16.7
FDA(3) 73.9 / 58.0 77.4 / 72.4 58.3 / 42.1 76.9 / 72.8 70.7 / 50.4 57.0 / 42.3 55.2 / 11.1 57.4 / 10.7 77.9 / 22.1
FDA(4) 76.1 / 60.7 79.4 / 74.9 56.0 / 41.5 79.1 / 75.3 73.0 / 53.2 55.0 / 42.1 58.1 / 12.1 60.4 / 11.4 80.1 / 22.5
FDA(5) 76.5 / 61.9 79.7 / 75.4 59.2 / 45.5 79.4 / 75.9 73.5 / 54.0 58.4 / 45.5 58.8 / 12.2 60.7 / 11.7 80.5 / 22.4
FDA(1)+xent 70.2 / 50.1 75.6 / 69.4 31.7 / 17.2 72.0 / 65.8 69.0 / 45.6 28.5 / 16.0 55.0 / 7.9 58.3 / 9.0 76.1 / 16.4
FDA(2)+xent 74.5 / 58.3 79.8 / 75.2 43.9 / 29.8 77.2 / 73.0 73.3 / 53.0 42.4 / 30.7 60.4 / 10.5 62.1 / 10.7 81.2 / 19.4
FDA(3)+xent 74.3 / 59.3 79.6 / 76.1 47.0 / 33.3 78.7 / 75.4 71.7 / 52.4 46.1 / 35.0 55.6 / 11.5 57.9 / 11.4 78.3 / 23.8
FDA(4)+xent 76.5 / 62.2 81.3 / 78.0 45.9 / 32.7 80.8 / 77.7 74.1 / 55.3 44.7 / 34.0 58.7 / 12.6 61.0 / 12.1 80.6 / 24.3
FDA(5)+xent 77.0 / 63.1 81.8 / 78.5 48.8 / 36.3 80.9 / 77.8 74.4 / 56.2 47.8 / 37.5 59.3 / 12.6 61.3 / 12.2 81.1 / 23.9
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situation. This is likely because the decision boundary structure of the two models is sufficiently
different that it is no longer relevant for generating attacks.
Scenario 3. In the last case, the whitebox model is trained on a subset of the blackbox model’s dataset,
which is represented in the RN50-A/B/C→DN121-Full columns. Not surprisingly, the transfer rates
of all methods are lower in this setting, likely because the complexity of the whitebox model’s task is
much simpler than the blackbox model’s task. Thus, the level of detail and granularity of the features
learned in the whitebox model is less. However, as with the other tests, all FDA-based methods
significantly outperform the TMIM method, and the multi-layer upgrades significantly advance the
performance over the vanilla FDA(1). An interesting takeaway is that the size of the whitebox’s subset
matters greatly. Even as we look from RN50-A/B to RN50-C as whitebox models, the performance
increases by over 20% error / 12% tSuc.
4.3 Query-based extension
A criticism of transfer-based blackbox attacks is that the success rate can be dependent on the
whitebox-blackbox pair: certain combinations may have more limited transfer in some instances, as
can be seen when MNv2 is the blackbox model in Table 1. In contrast, query-based blackbox attacks
directly estimate the gradient of the blackbox model via repetitive querying during attack generation
[35, 12, 3], and typically achieve higher success rates than transfer-based attacks. The principle
drawback to query attacks, which does not afflict transfer methods, is that for each adversarial
example the attacker may have to query the target model tens-of-thousands of times to properly
estimate the gradient, which in some cases may not be feasible due to time and monetary constraints,
or potential threat detection systems in the target model. Motivated by query efficiency, Cheng et al.
[3] incorporate the adversarial direction from a transfer-based attack as a prior in the P-RGF attack.
To show a potential way to extend our methods, in situations where limited queries to the blackbox
model are acceptable, we investigate using FDA(5)+xent and TMIM methods as priors in [3]. To
integrate with P-RGF, we extend the transfer methods to perturb for 15 total iterations. In the first
10, the noise is solely optimized on the whitebox model (as usual). Only in the last 5 iterations do
we use the transfer direction as the prior in the P-RGF estimator. We find warm-starting the transfer
direction in this way to be effective. The tSuc results for several transfer scenarios, under different
query budgets, for TMIM / FDA(5)+xent priors, are shown in Table 4.
Table 4: tSuc of transfer-based attacks used as a prior with P-RGF (prior = TMIM / FDA(5)+xent)
Whitebox Model = RN50 Whitebox Model = DN121
# Queries \\ Target DN121 VGG16bn MNv2 RN50 VGG16bn MNv2
0 3.0 / 57.9 1.5 / 43.5 0.1 / 22.9 2.3 / 50.1 1.3 / 48.0 1.0 / 24.4
100 5.5 / 70.5 3.3 / 60.3 2.1 / 35.5 4.8 / 63.0 3.1 / 65.8 2.0 / 37.1
500 7.5 / 81.2 6.2 / 77.3 4.2 / 56.8 6.6 / 79.7 5.8 / 86.2 3.9 / 65.8
1000 10.2 / 87.3 9.9 / 86.5 6.9 / 71.9 9.0 / 88.9 9.3 / 93.5 6.4 / 82.3
2000 14.9 / 92.9 16.9 / 93.4 12.3 / 85.5 13.0 / 94.7 16.0 / 97.3 11.9 / 93.2
In all transfer cases, we observe that the FDA(5)+xent attack yields a significantly better prior than
TMIM, which is aligned with the performance gaps observed in previous experiments. As the number
of queries to the blackbox model increases, the attack success rate increases, and the margin of
performance between the two priors grows to nearly 80% tSuc. With only 100 queries, the attack
success rate of FDA(5)+xent increases by over 10%, and with 2,000 queries the average tSuc rate is
over 90%. This result motivates future work on how to improve the feature space attack framework
through the allowance of a limited budget of queries to the target model during attack generation.
5 Conclusion
We introduce a feature space-based adversarial attack framework that allows for perturbations along
the extracted feature hierarchy of a DNN image classifier to achieve state-of-the-art targeted blackbox
attack transferability. In the “standard” blackbox transfer case, where the source and target model
share ImageNet-1K as a training dataset, our methods outperform output-layer-based attacks by a
factor of 10× and existing feature-space methods by a factor of 2− 3×. These performance gains are
attributed to the inclusion of multi-layer information, which leads to significantly higher disruption
in the feature spaces of both the whitebox and blackbox. In a set of three “strict” blackbox transfer
scenarios, where the training dataset and label spaces of the whitebox and blackbox models differ, we
show that our methods maintain similar performance margins over the baselines, even when there is
no training data overlap or a 985-class discrepancy in the label space. Finally, we show an extension
of the method for situations when it is acceptable to query the target model during attack generation.
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Appendix
A. Layer decoding tables
Figure 5: Layer notation of whitebox models and sequence in which layers get added to multi-
intermediate-layer attacks.
Here we discuss the DNN layer notation used throughout the work. We use two whitebox models:
ResNet50 (RN50) [9] and DenseNet121 (DN121) [10], which have been shown to be good sources
for generating transferable adversarial examples.
The RN50 notation follows the implementation in https://github.com/pytorch/vision/
blob/master/torchvision/models/resnet.py. RN50 has 4 layer groups, with {3, 4, 6, 3}
Bottleneck blocks in each, respectively. Of the 16 possible layers we notate 14 of them in Figure
5 where “deeper” layers closer to the output of the model have higher layer numbers. This is the
notation used in Figures 4 and 7.
The DN121 notation follows the implementation in https://github.com/pytorch/vision/
blob/master/torchvision/models/densenet.py. DN121 also has 4 main layer groups, with
{6, 12, 24, 16} layers in each, respectively. From the 58 possible layers, we sample 16 layers from
across the depth as shown in Figure 5.
As an example of how the layers are used in the attacks, when generating an attack from a RN50
whitebox that uses layers 5 and 10, this means that we are “probing” the model to extract the feature
map at the output of the {3,4} and {3,4,5} layers. The “Sequence” column is the order in which the 5
attacking layers get added to the multi-layer attack, as found by greedy optimization. See Appendix
B for more information about this process.
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B. Additional experimental setup details
Auxiliary models. Using pseudo-PyTorch notation, we use the following architecture for the
auxiliary models: [Conv(#kernels=128, kernel_size=3, stride=1, pad=1), ReLU,
MaxPool(2,2), Conv(#kernels=128, kernel_size=3, stride=1, pad=1), ReLU,
MaxPool(2,2), Dropout(p=0.3), linear(inputs=?, outputs=1)]. Note that the number
of nodes in the linear layer depends on the spatial size of the input feature map. We use this exact
architecture regardless of layer and feature map size, for simplicity reasons. Customizing the
auxiliary architecture to each layer in the whitebox model may result in better modeling of the feature
distributions at each layer, but we find this architecture to perform well enough.
Each auxiliary model is trained for 8,000 iterations with batch_size=64, momentum=0.9,
weight_decay=5e-4, initial_learning_rate=0.001, and a single learning rate decay step
at the 6,000th iteration to 0.0001. For each batch, we use a weighted sampling scheme to equalize
the counts of positive and negative training samples. Note, the training of each auxiliary model can
be done in a massively parallel fashion.
Greedy layer optimization. Selection of the whitebox model layers to target with FDA(N) is a
combinatorial problem. Rather than try out every possible combination, we use a greedy optimization
strategy to find the best layers in Section 4, which we elaborate on here. While this greedy approach
may not find the absolute optimum set of layers, we find that it still performs quite well, with each
added layer delivering significant gains in attack performance.
Note, in [14] the “optimal” attacking layer is found via sweeping across possible layers and using the
layer that empirically has the best tSuc rate. We adopt a similar scheme here. We only optimize to
find the attack layers once. When finding the attack layers for the RN50 whitebox model we use the
DN121 as a blackbox, and when finding the attack layers for DN121 we use the RN50 as a blackbox.
Using a random held-out set of 200 source images from the ImageNet validation set, we generate
attacks from each layer to find the best single layer to attack from. To find the best two layers to attack
from, we start with the best single layer and sweep the second layer to find the best complement to
the first layer. This process of using the best previous layers and finding the most complementary
new layer continues until we find the best 5 layers, where we notice a performance saturation. The
sequence of how the attacking layers get added is shown in the “Sequence” columns of Figure 5. For
example, for the FDA(3) attack on a RN50 whitebox, the layers used in the attack are {3,4,5}, {3,4},
and {3,4,2}. The hyper-parameters in the objective functions are found via line search. For the RN50
whitebox, η = 1e− 5 and γ = 1e− 4. For the DN121 whitebox, η = 1e− 6 and γ = 1e− 4. For
simplicity, in a multi-intermediate-layer attack all N layers are equally weighted, so λ` = 1/N .
Baseline attacks. The setup and configurations of the baseline attacks largely mirror the original
papers. Since the results in the TMIM+SGM [36] paper are all tuned for un-targeted attacks, we
do a similar line search on a held out dataset to find decay = 0.5 for RN50 and decay = 0.4 for
DN121. For the ensemble attack [17], all models are weighted equally, and we include momentum in
the optimization (although momentum is not discussed in the original paper) because it empirically
improves the results.
All of the attacks, including new ones and the baselines use L∞  = 16/255, step_size = 2/255 and
perturb_iters = 10.
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C. Full ensemble comparison results
Figure 6: Comparison of FDA methods to ensemble attacks.
Figure 6 shown an extension of the results in Figure 2 to include all of the transfer scenarios considered
in Section 4.1.1. The primary result is that our FDA methods, and particularly FDA(N)+xent,
outperforms the ensemble methods in all of these transfer scenarios in both error and tSuc. The
critical detail is that in these plots, our method is still crafting noise using the feature space of a single
source model, where the ensemble method is using output layer information from multiple source
models of varying architectures and depths. Since FDA and ensemble are seemingly orthogonal
methods, we leave it to future work to explore their combination.
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D. Extended analysis of disruption
Figure 7: Disruption of features caused by transfer attacks.
Here we extend the disruption results from Section 4.1.4 to include both RN50→DN121 and
DN121→RN50. The disruption caused by each attack is measured over 5,000 adversarial ex-
amples from each method. Adhering to the setup in Section 4, all source (clean) samples are correctly
classified by both the whitebox and blackbox. The results shown here echo the conclusions drawn in
Section 4.1.4. The main conclusions are as follows:
• The TMIM attack [5], which specifically leverages the output layer of the whitebox model, is only
capable of causing high disruption towards the output of the whitebox model. In both the early
layers of the whitebox and all throughout the blackbox model, TMIM causes very little disruption
w.r.t. the target class.
• The baseline FDA(1) method [14] causes significantly more disruption in the intermediate feature
spaces of both the whitebox and blackbox but has two undesirable behaviors. First, the intermediate
disruption is significantly higher in the whitebox than in the blackbox, even for the layers that
were not considered in the attack. Ideally, the intermediate space of the blackbox model would
show higher disruption. Second, the disruption in the final few layers of both the whitebox and
blackbox has a sharp decrease (as best seen in the RN50 whitebox and blackbox). This indicates
that although the intermediate feature maps look to be the target class with nearly 100% probability,
that does not automatically induce classification as the target class.
• The primary effect of the +xent component is to create higher disruption in the final few layers,
which directly addresses the weakness discussed in the previous bullet. This behavior is perhaps
best illustrated by comparing the FDA(1) and FDA(1)+xent results in the rightmost plot (RN50 as
a blackbox). From early through middle layers, the disruption is about the same, and in the final 3
layers the +xent version has higher disruption. As well as being quite intuitive behavior, this is
evidence for why the attack performs better.
• The notable effect of using multi-intermediate-layers is significantly more disruption in the inter-
mediate space of both whitebox and blackbox models. Looking at the whitebox models, as we
go from FDA(1) to FDA(2), the disruption is noticeably increased in the earlier layers. This is not
surprising, as from Figure 5, the second attack layer to be added in both cases is a layer closer to
the input layer. This trend of increased disruption in earlier layers is also observed in the blackbox
models. As we move from FDA(2) to FDA(4), from Figure 5 we have added 2 layers that are both
deeper in the model than the second layer added, so we do not see increased disruption in the
earlier layers. However, we do see increased disruption in the later layers, as expected because the
fourth layer added is the closest to the output of the whitebox model. This pattern of how including
early layers in the attack set causes early layer disruption and including late layers in the attack set
causes late layer disruption matches intuition and provides insight into how the attack works.
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E. Cross-distribution experiment
Figure 8: Class splits of Restricted-ImageNet subsets.
To evaluate the effect of differences in the training data distributions of the source and target model
we propose three splits of the ImageNet-1k dataset [4], which we call RestrictedImageNet-A/B/C
(RINet-A/B/C). To split the classes, we leverage the WordNet [20] hierarchical structure of the
dataset such that each class in a RINet set is a superclass category composed of multiple ImageNet-
1K classes, noted in Figure 8 as “components.” For example, the “fish” class of RINet-A (both
the train and val parts) is the aggregation of ImageNet-1k classes: [1:’tench’, 2:’goldfish’,
389:’barracouta’, 392:’rock-beauty’, 394:’sturgeon’]. See https://gist.github.
com/yrevar/942d3a0ac09ec9e5eb3a for the number to category translations.
RINet-A&B. One of the key experiments in this work is to measure the transfer performance when
the source and target models are trained on similar categories, but have no training data overlap.
This represents a more realistic attacking scenario when the adversary is aware of what classes the
target model is trained on (or at least most of them) but must collect their own data as they do not
have access to the target model’s training dataset. To simulate this scenario, we create RINet-A and
RINet-B, which each have 15 classes, of which 10 are shared between the two and 5 are unique, and
have zero training data overlap.
Figure 9: Standard accuracy of RINet models.
To perform our experiments, we trained a RN50 and
DN121 model on each of the splits using code from
https://github.com/pytorch/examples/
blob/master/imagenet/main.py. The accuracy
of each model is shown in Figure 9. Since it is not
meaningful to test an RINet-A model on the unique
classes of RINet-B, we show the test accuracy on the
“full” and “shared” classes only when appropriate. For the models trained and tested on the same
splits, the accuracy is about 95%. When the models are tested on the shared class data of the other
split, the test accuracy drops to about 81% − 87%, which is not surprising given the difference of
ImageNet classes used.
RINet-C. The other dataset considered is RINet-C. It has very similar construction to A & B in
that each class is an aggregation of five ImageNet-1K classes. However, RINet-C has 20 classes
which makes it a bigger subset than RINet-A/B. The purpose of including RINet-C is to measure
how important the size of the subset is when attacking in the RN50-A/B/C→DN121-FullINet and
RN50-FullINet→DN121-A/B/C scenarios. We train RN50 and DN121 RINet-C models in the same
way as we do the RINet-A/B models. The test accuracy of RN50-C is 95.2% and DN121-C is 96.3%.
Cross-distribution attack settings. Lastly, we discuss how we setup and carry out the attacks
in the cross-distribution experiments. Here, we assume the auxiliary models have been trained for
RN50-A/B/C/FullINet (training details in Appendix B).
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• Constants across all tests: The attacking parameters are still L∞  = 16/255, step_size = 2/255,
and perturb_iters = 10.
• RN50-A/B→DN121-A/B (Scenario 1): Since the source task is significantly different than Full-
ImageNet, we re-search for the best 5 attacking layers for the RN50-A/B models. We use the same
greedy search technique described in Appendix B only on the RN50-A→DN121-A transfer sce-
nario. In the notation of Figure 5, the sequence of adding attacks layers in the FDA(N)+xent frame-
work is: 1:[3,4,6,1], 2:[3,4,6], 3:[3,4,6,2], 4:[3,4,5], 5:[3,4,4]. We also find
that increasing the weight of the cross-entropy term to γ = 1e−3 helps. Other attacking parameters
stay the same: η = 1e− 5, λ` = 1/N . When attacking, we only consider source samples from the
shared-classes that are correctly classified by both the source and target models. We then target
each of the other 9 shared classes individually and do this for all source samples in the whitebox
model’s validation dataset. Given the classes are shared, the computation of error and tSuc is
straightforward.
• RN50-A/B/C→DN121-FullINet (Scenario 3): In these tests, we use the exact layer-set and hyper-
parameters used in Case 1. The only tricky part is how to define attack success because the class
structures are significantly different. Here, since the whitebox model is RN50-A/B/C, we work in
the label space of RINet-A/B/C. In the attack loop, for each source sample in the whitebox model’s
validation set that is correctly classified by both the whitebox and blackbox, we target each of
the other 14 (or 19 in the case of RINet-C) classes individually. An attack is successful if the
blackbox model’s top-1 prediction is one of the components that makes up the RINet target class.
For example, if we use RN50-A as the whitebox model, for the target label “spider” we count a
tSuc iff the DN121-FullINet model’s prediction is in [72, 75, 76]. This is also how we check that
the blackbox model is initially correct for each source sample. Note, this is a somewhat restrictive
definition of tSuc. If we attack with the target label “dog,” we only count a tSuc if the blackbox
model’s prediction is a component that made up the RINet’s dog class. However, ImageNet-1K
has over 150 “dog” sub-classes but tSuc only accounts for 5 of these.
• RN50-FullINet→DN121-A/B/C (Scenario 2): In these evaluations, we use the attack configu-
rations, layer set, and hyper-parameters from the main ImageNet transfer tests (i.e., we do not
tune for this particular test). As in Case 2, since the label spaces of the whitebox and blackbox
models are different, we must handle the conversion as to measure attack success. For each source
image in the ImageNet-1K validation set, we first check that it is a component of the target model’s
dataset, then we check that it is correctly classified by both the whitebox and blackbox using
their respective label spaces. Using images that passed both these checks, we then target each
of the other 14 (or 19) classes in the RINet label space by randomly choosing a Full-ImageNet
target label from the component set of the target RINet class. For example, if we want to target
“bird” on the RN50-B blackbox model, we would randomly select a label from the component set
[12, 14, 15, 19, 20] and use that as the target label in the Full-ImageNet space. With this, computing
error and tSuc is straightforward.
Lastly, we would like to emphasize that we did not re-tune all of the hyper-parameters and layer
sets for each individual transfer. We mention this to illustrate that the method and results are not
ultra-sensitive to these parameters (within reason). However, it would not be surprising if the transfer
results improve if we tuned the hyper-parameters for each situation.
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